Chronology of the Formation of 1st Battalion, 87th Mountain Infantry
Compiled for New England Ski Museum's 2016 Exhibit
The Mountain Troops and Mountain Culture in Postwar America

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World War I: "Avalanches are a potent weapon: 10,000 Italian mountain troops were wiped out in one battle alone by a German-instigated snowslide, and 40% of the mountain troop casualties were due to avalanches alone."
Captain John C. Jay, *The Mountain Training Center,* Study No. 24, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946, photocopy in New England Ski Museum collection 2000.042.008, 80.

1914-1915: "Before Alsace-Lorraine was overrun by the Germans, the Chausseurs fought a series of brave actions on skis in the low, forested Vosges during the winter of 1914-15. That same winter the Russians were decisively beaten by Austro-German Jäger on the Carpathian front. These Jäger now were free to take part in the most remarkable mountain war ever fought, the war in the Dolomite Alps."
Hal Burton, *The Ski Troops*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), 13.

1915, 1916: "The mountain war was a grim war. By the estimate of historians for the US Army Ground Forces, more men were killed in climbing accidents and avalanches than by gunfire. The sheer size of the two armies, essential to garrison a frontier of such length, meant that lowland soldiers had to be used to "beef up" the elite Alpini and Jäger divisions, which comprised less than one fifth of the total fighting force. During the winters of 1915 and 1916 whole battalions unskilled in the hazards of mountains were wiped out by avalanches:
Hal Burton, *The Ski Troops*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), 16.

Winter 1939: "During the winter of 1939 the commanding officer at Fort Snelling, Minnesota, in the cold and snowy country just outside Minneapolis-St. Paul, had obtained permission to start the most modest sort of ski training program. A young German immigrant named Hans Wagner was hired as instructor. There was no money for modern ski equipment—if indeed anyone beside Wagner knew that such equipment existed. The half-frozen GIs slid around the Fort Snelling parade ground on toestrap skis, using thin GI boots as substitutes for ski boots."
Hal Burton, *The Ski Troops*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), 67.

Summer, 1939: "Among the lesser known civilian players in this [equipment] effort was Adams Carter, who was added to the staff because of his linguistic capability and knowledge of mountains in other lands; he was supposed to keep tabs on what both friend and foe were using for clothing and mountain equipment. In the summer of 1939, Carter had been climbing in Switzerland with his friend Hermann Ogi, of the famous west Oberland guiding family, who was wearing an unusual pair of climbing boots shod with experimental rubber soles then being developed by Vitale Bramani, an Italian mountain equipment designer and purveyor. …Carter came home convinced that Bramani was onto something.

…Hubert Adams Carter, a member of the Society of Friends, would not bear arms in combat, but served those of us in uniform far better than most. More than any other item developed, his promotion of the Bramani sole as a feature of the Boot Mountain, 1942, was a landmark in alpine equipage. After the war he returned to his teaching job at the notable Milton Academy…His energetic editorship of the *American Alpine Journal* has established an equally valued landmark in literature."
William Lowell Putnam, *Green Cognac*.(New York: The AAC Press, 1991), 20, 212.

Mid-November 1939: "Brigadier General (BG) Irving J. Phillipson, the chief of staff of the II Corps Area, with the support of Lieutenant General (LTG) Hugh A. Drum, commander of the First Army, began planning to hold winter maneuvers at Pine Camp on the Pine Plains Military Reservation….Conducting the winter training at Pine Camp would take advantage of the installation's consistent winter conditions."
Douglas Schmidt, "The Origins of Winter Warfare Training in the United States Army and its Connection to the Modern Army", ms shared with author, page 2-3.

November 30, 1939: "Russia, a nation of 190,000,000 population, attacked Finland, a nation of barely 3,000,000…. A giant country was attacking a tiny one, and taking an unmerciful beating. Finns on skis were outranging, outflanking and baffling a highly mechanized Russian Army attacking in traditional fashion along the few roads that

crossed the Russo-Finnish border…. They bypassed the heavily fortified Mannerheim Line across the Karelian Isthmus, hoping that victory farther north would save them the cost of a frontal assault. But the country was not easy…. The Russians hugged the roads. They sent out cars, trucks, field kitchens and motorized artillery. The Finns simply melted into the forest on their skis. …The Finns concentrated their attacks on brigade headquarters and field headquarters, leaving the command forces to face hunger and cold. Silently, stealthily, they built winter roads parallel to the Red columns on the main highways. …Every two miles or so, along these winter roads, the Finns cleared paths to the highways and fell upon the Russians. By the second week in January, the Reds' principal thrust along the highway from Suomossalmi had ended in disaster: 36,000 Russians were dead and fewer than 15,000 Finns."
Hal Burton, *The Ski Troops*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), 20-21.

January 3, 1940: "…the first contingent of roughly 300 soldiers [from 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment] arrived at Pine Camp on January 3, 1940. Two days later LTG Drum, his Chief of Staff, COL Francis B. Wilby, and BG Phillipson reviewed the troops and watched as ski mounted detachments demonstrated their ability to maneuver across the snow covered terrain."
Douglas Schmidt, "The Origins of Winter Warfare Training in the United States Army and its Connection to the Modern Army", ms shared with author, page 3

Winter 1940: "The Russians had ski troops of their own, but they had been trained on the open plains, and with equipment designed for such travel. For bindings, they used the traditional toe plate and heel strap created for high-altitude ski troops in World War I. By contrast, the Finns used narrow cross-country skis, to which the boots were attached only at the toe. In a fire fight, the Finnish skis could be kicked off quickly…the Russians were trapped in their cumbersome bindings…. Eventually, good sense dawned on the Russians. …The Soviet generals then did what they should have done in the first place. They staged a frontal attack against the Mannerheim Line on the Karelian Isthmus and at the same time sent men and equipment across the frozen ice of the Gulf of Finland to outflank it. The Finns…fought to the end, but on March 13, 1940, they signed a peace treaty that ceded much of the Karelian Isthmus, plus the fortress of Viborg, to the Russians."
Hal Burton, *The Ski Troops*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971),22-23.

January 6, 1940: The Assistant Secretary of War, Louis A. Johnson, asked General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, what consideration had been given to special clothing, equipment, food, transportation and other essentials necessary to an effective field force under winter conditions approximating those of Finland and northern Russia. The low priority given winter troops was apparent when Langley received a frosty answer to his letter to Woodring. The response arrived in late spring. It was the standard brushoff letter, signed by an underling."
Hal Burton, *The Ski Troops*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), 64.

February 1940: "At Bromley Mountain, as everywhere skiers gathered that winter, the discussion inevitably came around to the Russo-Finnish War. At Johnny Seesaw's, the oldest ski lodge in the Manchester area, the four men warming their shanks before the fire shared a special interest in that war on skis. Livermore, Langley, Dole and Bright….were worrying about a winter invasion and an American helpless against troops trained in winter warfare…."Seems to me," drawled Langley, "that I ought to write the Secretary of War and offer him the services of the National Ski Association." The Secretary of War at the time was Harry H. Woodring. Langley didn't know him, but he could see no harm in trying to get through to him."
Hal Burton, *The Ski Troops*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), 64.

March 1940: "The soldiers of the 28th Infantry Regiment continued training through March 1940."
Douglas Schmidt, "The Origins of Winter Warfare Training in the United States Army and its Connection to the Modern Army", ms shared with author, page 2-3

May 1940: "The American Alpine Club urges the War Department to introduce mountain warfare training in the U.S. Army."
John Imbrie, *A Chronology of the 10th Mountain Division in World War II.* (Watertown, NY: National Association of the 10th Mountain Division. 2001), 1.

June 10, 1940: "…it is possible that the U.S. Army may wish to have troops trained in Ski Patrol work.

Roger Langley, President of the National Ski Association, has told me that he has in mind offering the services of the National Ski Association to the Government….If members of the National Ski Patrol wish it, I propose to signify to President Langley, our willingness to cooperate as an organized group of skiers, familiar with winter problems, in whatever way the National Ski Association deems it best to offer its help to the Government…Therefore, will you please fill out the form below and send it by return mail."
Charles M. Dole, Memorandum to All National Ski Patrolmen, June 10, 1940, Dole Papers, FF49, Box 7, "Birth and Growth of 10th Mountain Division," Denver Public Library, photocopy in New England Ski Museum collection, 2007.049.003.

Early 1940: "At the beginning of World War II certain officers in the War Department recognized the fact that troops require specialized training to operate successfully under conditions of snow and extreme cold. As a result, early in 1940, Lt. Col. Nelson M Walker and Lt. Col. Charles E. Hurdis were given the task of exploring the possibilities of ski troops.
Almost immediately it was apparent that winter operations were impossible without suitable clothing and equipment, and equally obvious that suitable items were not available in the Quartermaster General's warehouses.

(Footnote: To these two officers great credit is due for their part in organizing the first mountain regiment and in encouraging the War Department to continue mountain training in the face of severe criticisms. Both men were given other duties during the middle days of the war, and were unable to continue to give direct aid to mountain training. Later Nelson Walker (then Brig. Gen.) was killed by a German machine gun in France. In him the mountains and all lovers of the mountains lost a true friend. Brig. Gen. Hurdis later served with distinction against the Japanese in the Philippines)".
Albert H. Jackman, "The Tenth Mountain Division: A Successful Experiment", *The American Alpine Journal*, Special War Number, 6, no. 2 (1946): 187.

June, 1940: "A Yale graduate, and since 1938 the Chairman of the National Ski Patrol System, Dole deserves a great share of the credit for the formation of the Mountain Training Center. In June 1940, seeing the handwriting on the wall, he went to the II Corps Headquarters on Governors Island, N.Y. and told the history of the National Ski Patrol to the chief of staff, offering to the Army the services of his organization of more than three thousand trained ski patrolmen. Gen. Irving I. Phillipson replied that the Army was planning to train in the south that winter, but suggested that Dole contact Washington."
Captain John C. Jay, *The Mountain Training Center*, Study No. 24, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946, photocopy in New England Ski Museum collection 2000.042.008, 2.

July 8, 1940: "We found General Phillipson interested, sympathetic but not encouraging. He stated, "You do not have to try and sell me, for you are right…The attack might very well come in the winter as we know that they have 14 highly trained mountain and winter divisions and they know that we know nothing about winter fighting. I should send you to Washington with my blessing, but they would only say 'There's Phillipson shooting off his face again.' You better go, but it will be a long uphill battle.""
Charles M. Dole, "Birth and Growth of 10th Mountain Division," Denver Public Library, Dole Papers, FF49, Box 7, photocopy in New England Ski Museum collection, 2007.049.003.

July 8, 1940: "General Phillipson, a rotund man with a gruff manner, took them into his confidence. "I suppose I know more than anyone in the Army about the necessity for winter warfare training. I have been in command of Pine Camp (just outside Watertown, New York) in the winter. I know the effect of cold weather on troops. They simply hate to maneuver in subzero weather. When you need winter troops, you need them badly. This kind of force is not trained overnight either. I would gladly open the doors of the War Department for you, but it might do you more harm than good. They'd only say: "There's Phillipson shooting off his face again.""
Hal Burton, *The Ski Troops*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), 70.

July 18, 1940: "This he (Dole) did, writing President Roosevelt on 18 July, 1940, to summarize the case for skiers in the service and contending that "it is more reasonable to make soldiers out of skiers than skiers out of soldiers." He concluded by suggesting establishment of two camps, and in the East and in the Northwest, where about two hundred men could be trained in military patrol work, preparatory to being sent to other army units as instructors."
Captain John C. Jay, *The Mountain Training Center*, Study No. 24, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946,

photocopy in New England Ski Museum collection 2000.042.008, 2.

Summer 1940: "The name of "Minnie" Dole runs prominently through this record, but he had a partner in the background all the way in John E.P. Morgan, treasurer of the National Ski Patrol Committee, inventor of the Broken Bone Club, a taciturn, corn-cob-pipe-smoking individual who has had a hand in many national skiing activities of recent years. Add to theirs the name of Bestor Robinson, who later headed the Equipment Section, and you have the three who have guided the Association's national defense effort.

Bearing a letter to Arthur Palmer, special assistant to the secretary of war, Dole and Morgan barged into Washington on the hottest day of the summer. They talked to Palmer, told their story to Senator Wadsworth, co-sponsor of the Burke-Wadsworth compulsory military training bill, and in the non-air-conditioned Munitions building conferred with staff officers."
Fred H. McNeil, "Skiing and the National Defense", *American Ski Annual,* (1941-42): 8.

Summer 1940: "John and I took off for Washington without the faintest idea of how we would accomplish our mission or who would listen to us. On the train I suddenly remembered an old classmate of mine from Yale, Stu Symington, now working in Washington. His father-in-law, Senator Wadsworth, had the "Burke-Wadsworth Draft Bill" before Congress at that time. I called Stu as soon as we arrived in Washington, and he agreed to introduce us to the Senator. Wadsworth listened to our tale. "You couldn't be righter," he said. "General Bruckner up in Alaska is screaming for more troops right now and we haven't got them." And with that he picked up the telephone and arranged for us to see Clarence Hubner, a colonel on the General Staff, the next morning. …Colonel Hubner was not impressed. …Once we were on the train to New York, we had time to realize how very right General Phillipson had been about a "long uphill fight"."
Minot Dole, *Adventures in Skiing.* (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1965), 94-96.

Summer 1940: "I rummaged about for an approach (to General Marshall). Then I remembered another Yale classmate who was a law partner of Colonel Stimson, the then Secretary of War. His name was Hayden Smith. Hayden put us in touch with a young business associate of his, Arthur Palmer, who had gone to Washington to work in Stimson's office. Palmer would be able to help. We met Palmer in Stimson's outer office. Palmer had Stimson's military aide, a Major Regnier, with him. We talked for two hours…Major Regnier seemed impressed. He asked intelligent questions, and had obviously grasped the proposal. …then the Major said, "Of course I can't guarantee the outcome, but I think you have a sound premise and I shall report to Stimson on your behalf.""
Minot Dole, *Adventures in Skiing.* (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1965), 97-98.

Fall 1940: "When the U.S. Army started its rapid expansion in the fall of 1940, the campaigns of the German Gerbirgsjägers in Norway were still fresh in the minds of the public. The mountaineering world realized that the only effective resistance to them had been made by the French Chasseurs Alpins aided by British and mountain trained Poles near Narvik. Troops specially trained for cold weather fighting had already proved their worth in Finland. Soon the Balkan campaign emphasized the importance of mountain troops. Some people remembered the bitter fighting in the First World War in the Carpathians, the Vosges and the Alps, and others recalled the decisive mountain victory of Caporetto, which nearly knocked Italy out of the war."
H. Adams Carter, "Mountain Intelligence", *American Alpine Journal,* Special War Number, 6, no. 2, 1946., 244.

September 12, 1940: "Next step was an appointment with Gen. Marshall in September 1940. The General said that several divisions were being left in the North for winter training, and thanked Dole and Morgan for their assistance."
Captain John C. Jay, *The Mountain Training Center,* Study No. 24, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946, photocopy in New England Ski Museum collection 2000.042.008, 2.

September 12, 1940: "Then ensued a conversation that was a repetition of what we had told and tried to tell others. Questions were asked and Answered to the best of our limited ability. When the meeting was over, General Marshall arose, shook hands and thanked us for coming and said simply, "Gentlemen, you will hear from me shortly one way or the other.""
Charles M. Dole, "Birth and Growth of 10th Mountain Division," Denver Public Library, Dole Papers, FF49, Box 7,

photocopy in New England Ski Museum collection, 2007.049.003.

September 24, 1940: "I am informed by the G-3 Division that two general plans are under study and in preparation: (1) the establishment of an agency for test and development of clothing and materiel for winter warfare operations, and (2) the procurement of skis and other equipment with which to begin ski instruction in certain divisions, initially for morale and recreational purposes."
General George C. Marshall to C.M. Dole, September 24, 1940, "Birth and Growth of 10th Mountain Division," Denver Public Library, Dole Papers, FF49, Box 7, photocopy in New England Ski Museum collection, 2007.049.003.

Ca. October 6, 1940: "About twelve days later, Colonel Nelson M. Walker, of the General Staff, met Dole and Morgan at the Yale Club in New York City, under instructions from General Marshall. "Johnnie" Walker appeared with Colonel Charles M. Hurdis, also of the General Staff. What they had to offer was a pilot force, a test force operating on skis. But there was a worm in the gift apple. The men in the pilot force would have to get by wearing GI issue overshoes and skis with leather toestraps—no bindings. To skilled skiers like Dole and Morgan this raised the red flag. Politely but vehemently, they argued that soldiers would learn nothing, could only flounder about, and would become discouraged in a hurry. Walker listened tolerantly, and then said: "Remember that, in dealing with the Army, you must follow the old Polish saying: 'Nothing is ever eaten as hot as it is cooked.' Let's get our foot in the door, then we'll fight." So toestrap skis it was."
Hal Burton, *The Ski Troops*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), 77.

Ca. October 6, 1940: "After twelve days [from Dole's meeting with Marshall] I received a call from a Colonel Nelson M. Walker of the General Staff in Washington. Walker said that under instructions from General Marshall he was coming to New York to talk to Morgan and myself. The meeting was arranged for the following day at the Yale Club. Colonel Walker, "Johnnie" as he was nicknamed, appeared with a Colonel Charles Hurdis, also of the General Staff. They were both good men, and when it turned out that we four were all trout fishermen or parts, the ice was broken. Even so, we were surprised when we found the two colonels enthusiastic. They assured us of full support, but said we must really get down to essentials….

Next we discussed the N.S.P.S.'s role. We said that our office space was small, and the staff—one secretary—was somewhat meager. They suggested that our appearance should be upped. A more impressive office would look more potent to the War Department people. "How much do you think you would need to set up a bona fide operation?" asked Walker. I was a bit nettled—nothing was more bona fide than the N.S.P.S.—but I swallowed that feeling. I turned to John, master of our dwindling funds. He scribbled me a note which read, "$3,500."

"Sixty-five hundred," I replied, with as bland an expression as I could muster. Walker said he would see what could be done.

Within a couple of days we received a letter from Walker enclosing a check for $2,500 and promising the balance was available when we needed it. A letter from General Marshall followed. The General informed me that an agency had been established to test and develop clothing and material for winter operations, and that the Army was procuring skis and other equipment with which to begin ski instruction in certain divisions, initially for morale and recreational purposes. Although these two plans were only in their infant stages, the General said that it was likely that the War Department would be calling on the N.S.P.S. for advice and help. The die had been cast….

With the funds that Johnnie Walker had sent us, we set up a small office in the Graybar Building in New York. John had a good friend, Stephen Hurlbut, who joined us. Steve was a lanky ex-schoolteacher and a stickler for detail. To him would fall the lot of processing the papers that would soon stream into the N.S.P.S. office every day.

No sooner had we opened shop than an old friend of mine, Jack Tappin, entered. Ex-Princeton man and an ardent skier, he wanted to know what was going on. We told him briefly and he immediately wanted to join us. "But Jack," I said, "there are three of us now and as yet there is not really enough for any of us to do. We get no pay, it's all voluntary. The best thing for you to do is to go to Washington and talk with Johnnie Walker."

He trudged off disappointed, but I guess he was born lucky, for in Washington he found that Colonel Hurdis was his old

artillery instructor at Princeton. In no time he was taken on as a civilian advisor to the Army group working on this project. Jack was a shrewd and able guy and knew what he was talking about when it came to winter equipment. He became an invaluable tie in our little bureaucratic communications linkup."
Minot Dole, *Adventures in Skiing.* (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1965),100-102.

Ca. October 1940: "After Minnie Dole's 1940 letter to President Roosevelt, Colonels Nelson Walker and Charles Hurdis were assigned to study the possibilities of ski troops. Almost immediately it became apparent that winter operations were impossible without adequate quantities of suitable equipment and clothing, material items that were never a prior concern to the quartermaster general. To handle this problem, a special unit was soon established in that branch of the service, the Office of Research and Development. This was headed by a brilliant and imaginative professor of industrial management from Harvard Business School, Georges Doriot.

Working with this office before the Pearl Harbor attack were a number of persons distinguished in American alpinism: Bill House, who led the critical pitch of what is now the standard route on K2, the House Chimney; Bob Bates, Bill's companion on the 1938 chimney climb; Bradford Washburn, already on his way towards being an authority on Alaskan alpinism; Richard Leonard, a pioneer of Yosemite high-angle climbing; Terris Moore, who led the famous Minya Konka climb in 1932; Bestor Robinson, who headed the National Ski Association's Advisory Committee on Equipment; and several others….

An early start of demanding cold weather equipment for the military had come from an internal source, too. Lt. General Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., then heading the Alaska Defense Command, had been pleading for help from the quartermaster to enable his men to operate effectively outside their barracks. Other external advisors to the procurement and training efforts were the famous Australian polar authority and explorer, Sir George Hubert Wilkins, and his mentor, the internationally renowned artic survival expert, Vilhjámur Stefánsson."
William Lowell Putnam, *Green Cognac: The Education of a Mountain Fighter*. (New York: The AAC Press, 1991), 19-20.

October 1940: Adams Carter of the American Alpine Club writes a report "Suggestions About Mountain Troops", that anticipates the importance of equipment development (lightweight food, sleeping bags, tents, clothing); the need for pack artillery; and engineering groups that could construct portable tramways. Carter discusses with Secretary of War Stimson sometime in 1940. Stimson knew Carter through Milton Academy and AAC.
"Suggestions About Mountain Troops", October 1940, Typescript in Denver Public Library 10th Mountain Division Resource Center.

Ca. October 1940: "Shortly after returning to Exeter, I had conversations with James Bryant Conant, president of Harvard, about his son Jim, an Exeter student…. Mr. Conant wanted to do a rock climb in the White Mountains and asked if we could all do one together. With my brother's help, I agreed to take father and son up the "Pinnacle" on Mt. Washington. …The day was successful in more ways than one, because we talked much of the time about how mountain troops could be useful to the American army."
Robert H. Bates, *The Love of Mountains Is Best.* (Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Peter Randall, 1994), 165.

October 1940: "In Washington, meanwhile, an agency had been set up in the office of the Quartermaster General to test and develop clothing and material for winter operations. The first expert summoned, a civilian, was Robert H. Bates, a distinguished alpinist, who had taken part in the ascent of Nanda Devi in the Himalayas with a British-American expedition, and in the attempt of an American expedition to climb K2, second highest mountain in the world. He was soon joined by Albert H. Jackman, a captain in the Army reserve, with long skiing experience, and then by a very social civilian volunteer, John H. Tappin. Tappin was a fine skier, and for several years had been head of the ski clothing department at Brooks Brothers. He was the son of Mrs. Huntington Tappin, who arranged dinners and coming-out parties for important New York families."
Hal Burton, *The Ski Troops*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), 77-78.

November 3, 1940: "Colonel Walker amplified that, under questioning, and stated that a simple leather strap binding would be used and that the individual would wear the issue boot encased in the issue overshoe. I beg of you to give this one thought full consideration. The very basis of any maneuvers on skis is the ability of the skier to transmit

brain reaction to his foot and toes. His foot must be so attached to his skis that the muscular reaction of his foot will be transferred to the full length of the ski from tip to heel."
C.M. Dole to General George C. Marshall, November 3, 1940, "Birth and Growth of 10th Mountain Division," Denver Public Library, Dole Papers, FF49, Box 7, photocopy in New England Ski Museum collection, 2007.049.003.

November 9, 1940: "With reference to equipping the battalions for elementary training with skis having only a simple strap binding, you are entirely correct that this is a poor substitute for the proper equipment. The War Department's decision in this matter is necessarily based, not upon what is desirable, but what is practicable. To purchase a good quality binding involves the test for determination of type, the advertisement for competitive bids and the formulation of complicated contracts. Having a good binding, the same thing then holds true for ski boots with the additional complication of tariff sizes. We can, however, secure skis with a simple strap binding in a single contract without much hocus-pocus…. As soon as we can procure proper bindings and boots in quantity, we can throw away the strap bindings and put the better binding on the same pair of skis."
Lt. Col. Nelson M. Walker to C. Minot Dole, November 9, 1940, "Birth and Growth of 10th Mountain Division," Denver Public Library, Dole Papers, FF49, Box 7, photocopy in New England Ski Museum collection, 2007.049.003.

November 1940: "When Dole paid a visit to Washington to offer his services to the Winter Warfare Board, his prime worry was the kind of equipment that would be issued the troops. Gaither handed over a manual entitled, "Alaskan Equipment, Revised Edition, August 1914." Dole, a peppery and earnest man, flipped through the manual and said, "Junk it. It doesn't apply." And Gaither did, but not without asking for more current advice from the National Ski Association. That body formed a winter equipment committee in November, headed by Bestor Robinson, the most zealous experimenter with winter and mountain equipment anywhere in the United States. Other members included Langley and Dole (ex-officio), Alfred M. Lindley (who had climbed Mt. McKinley on skis), Douglas Burckett, of the Appalachian Mountain Club in Boston, Walter A. Wood, an expert on the Alaska mountains, and Peter Hostmark, a Seattle ski-mountaineer."
Hal Burton, *The Ski Troops*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), 79-80.

Late November 1940: "…the Army summoned a meeting to review the equipment problem at its headquarters on Commonwealth Pier, Boston. Colonel George Grice, representing the War Department, opened the meeting genially wit the comment: "Gentlemen, I don't know a mukluk from a ski pole, but I know how to ask questions and to get the answers. I know we must have the proper equipment for this project to succeed." He soon found that even the skiers present—among them Dole, Robinson, Tappin, Livermore and Langley—couldn't agree on the properties of the various types of wood used in making skis. Grice, no dawdler, had the Army fly in a man from the Forest Laboratories in Madison, Wisconsin. Every aspect of skiing and ski equipment was discussed by specialists, and finally agreement was hammered out on basic items of equipment….

The Equipment Committee, however, was lucky in its personnel. The chairman was Robinson, who had for years experimented with ski equipment, mountaineering equipment, and techniques for both sports. He was the first mountaineer to become involved with the ski troops, and in large part was responsible for the gradual shift of emphasis by the Army from cross-country skiing to mountain skiing, and then to a combination of skiing and climbing that would make the troops mobile whether or not there was snow on the ground."
Minot Dole, *Adventures in Skiing*. (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1965), 81.

Late November 1940: "Late in November 1940, the Volunteer Winter Defense Committee met with the National Ski Association at La Crosse, Wis., to discuss further ski training for the Army**,** and it was out of this session that the Equipment Committee was born. General Marshall had assigned Lt. Cols. Charles E. Hurdis and Nelson M. Walker to attend the conferences and it is interesting to note that these two officers, who had come to seek advice and cooperation for this new Army venture from the experts of the ski world, soon discovered to their amusement that even the experts couldn't agree on such fundamental issues as the type of binding to be used.

Nevertheless the work of the Equipment Committee was far-reaching and of value to the Army. Established at La Crosse in November 1940, by Alfred D. Lindley of Minneapolis, who stipulated that it should report directly to the War Department "on necessary equipment and technic of ski troops," it was headed by Bestor Robinson, well-known skier and mountaineer from Oakland, Calif., and included Alfred Lindley, Douglas Burkett of Boston, and Peter Hostmark of

Seattle. Langley and Dole were later added ex officio, and the group was further enlarged to include John E. P. Morgan, Charles M. Dudley, of Hanover, N.H., Walter A. Wood, Alaskan explorer from the American Geographical Society, Rolf Monson, instructor at Lake Placid, and David J. Bradley of Madison, Wisconsin, a former member of the Finnish Military Ski Patrol."
Captain John C. Jay, *The Mountain Training Center*, Study No. 24, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946, photocopy in New England Ski Museum collection 2000.042.008, 6-7.

December 5, 1940: "The Finns had been overrun by Russia before the winter of 1940-1941, and the British had also been driven out of Norway by German mountain troops who overran their last foothold, the northern port of Narvik. As the first snows frosted the topmost tier of states, the commanders of six northern U.S. Army divisions sent out a call for the skiers tucked away in their ranks. The Department of the Army had ordered winter training for the 1st Division at Fort Devens, Massachusetts; the 44th Division at Fort Dix, New Jersey; the 5th Division at Fort Custer, Michigan; the 6th Division at Fort Leonard Wood Missouri; and the 41st and 3rd Divisions at Fort Lewis, Washington. The objective was to set up a series of ski patrols that could, if necessary, serve as the eyes for road-bound divisions—a compromise based upon what the Finns had done in fighting the Russians. Selected men, if possible, woodsmen or skiers, were to be further trained in skiing, snowshoeing and camping under extreme conditions in the snow and high mountains. Each patrol was given $1,200 to buy ski equipment locally—not enough, of course, to equip each man completely, but enough so that groups of men could be trained in turn."
Hal Burton, *The Ski Troops*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), 84-85.

Fall 1940: "In the Fall of 1940, Bill House, Charlie Houston and I asked American Alpine Club to discuss the part it might play in national defense. Ad Carter and Walter Wood were also active. Walter had asked me to join his expedition to the Yukon the following summer and I had agreed. He now asked me to help him set up an exhibition of up-to-date mountain equipment to show Major General Woodruff, a senior army officer. The display and the discussion that followed obviously made an impression on him."
Robert H. Bates, *The Love of Mountains Is Best.* (Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Peter Randall, 1994), 167.

Fall 1940: "When I reported to Capt. Gaither in the Chief of Infantry's Office in the Fall of 1940, he gave me the Winter Warfare File to read so that I would know where we would have to start development. The file consisted of one folder about ¼ inch thick. So far as I can remember, there was no special clothing. The entire army was issued wool underwear (longjohns), wool socks, wool shirts, wool trousers (breeches laced at the leg to permit the use of wool wrap puttees, canvas or leather leggings or riding boots), leather high shoes with or without hobnails, a high collar wool blouse of the same material as the breeches, and a long heavy wool overcoat. A cap with earflaps was worn when it was too cold for the campaign hat. Gloves, scarves, sweaters were usually not issued, but permissible."
Albert H. Jackman to Georgianna Contiguglia, June 21, 1992, New England Ski Museum 2004.022.001.

December 8, 1940: "The training area of the 5th Division was shifted from Ft. Custer, Mich., to Camp McCoy, Wisc., because of more suitable snow conditions at the latter station. Since this was to be the most concentrated training of all, a Winter Warfare Training Board of officers and men was set up, under the direction of Capt. Albert H. Jackman, as of 8 December, 1940. Patrol training was carried out by the 3d Battalion, 2nd Infantry, consisting of about a thousand officers and men, using basic equipment."
Major John C. Jay, *The Mountain Training Center*, Study No. 24, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1948, 4. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA955065, accessed 9-1-2022.

December 10, 1940: "I have been working on the plan and by now I expect that General Marshall has heard the first rough ideas about it. To sum up what I have done, here are a few of the things. I saw Cameron Forbes last Wednesday, who was wildly enthusiastic and called General McCoy on the telephone. He in turn asked to see me. I took Thursday off and traveled to New York. He was equally enthusiastic and told me how for some time he has felt the need for troops that could operate in any rough or uninhabited country. He told me that I might go to see Marshall with his backing but that actually he felt that it might be better for him to suggest the plan first and for me to see him after that. He felt that at this time General Marshall is so busy that he might not listen to our plan properly if a layman suggested it.

Actually I have heard nothing from the A.A.C. Are they doing anything or is Hank still talking?"
H. Adams Carter to Robert Bates, December 10, 1940, photocopy in New England Ski Museum, 2004.022.001.

December 20 1940: "General Woodruff's reaction [to the display set up by Wood and Bates] may have triggered a letter afterward, on December 20, 1940, to the American Alpine Club from Colonel Harry L. Twaddle, acting assistant chief of staff of the U.S. Army. This letter asked for information on essential items of mountaineering equipment that could be of use to the army. There was no mention of mountain troops."
Robert H. Bates, *The Love of Mountains Is Best.* (Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Peter Randall, 1994), 167.

ca. Early 1941: "These were the work of Bates, Adams Carter and the others who had signed up with the Office of the Quartermaster General to work on special equipment. Perhaps their most important contribution was a combined ski-mountain boot. In the early days, a skier had to wear his ski boots and carry clumsy, nailed boots which worked poorly on rock though well on ice. They had heard reports of a new type of rubber sole, with cleats on it, which mountaineers were using in Europe, called the Bramani sole. "One weekend," recalls Carter, "we were testing equipment at Pinkham Notch Camp, under Mt. Washington, New Hampshire, when a climber walked in with a pair of Bramanis on. We practically wrestled him to the floor, and wouldn't let him up until he promised us those boots. In return we generously permitted him to complete his climb the next day.""
Hal Burton, *The Ski Troops*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), 106.

Early 1941: "Almost simultaneously, the AAC had organized a National Defense Committee, chaired by geographer Walter Wood, a mountaineer of wide experience. The committee's other members were Carl Blaurock, John Case, Carlton Fuller, Charles Houston, Terris Moore, Clark Schurman, and Kenneth A Henderson, plus the NSA's Richard Leonard and Bestor Robinson.

After conferring with several AAC officials, Major General Harry Twaddle, an Ohio native charged with war mobilization planning, wrote a strong memo in early April 1941, and began the push for specialized training camps."
William Lowell Putnam, *Green Cognac: The Education of a Mountain Fighter*. (New York: The AAC Press, 1991), 27.

February 1941: "The 44th Division Ski Patrol was formed from men of that unit stationed at Ft. Dix, N.J. In charge was Lt. Eric C. Wikner, formerly of Sweden, with considerable experience in cross-country skiing and winter camping. Pvt. Harold Sorensen, Olympic skier from Norway, who had been inducted into the Army a few days previously, was selected as coach for the patrol of twenty-three men. The area surrounding Old Forge, N.Y., was chosen as the training ground."
Major John C. Jay, *The Mountain Training Center*, Study No. 24, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1948, 4. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA955065, accessed 9-1-2022.

February 9, 1941: "…Camp McCoy is a summer artillery range area of about 25,000 acres in most ways similar to Pine Camp where the Princetonians got their first range practice. The only buildings on the reservation are a row of mess halls, latrines, a small building called the Officer's Club (so small that some of the field officers have their quarters in the nice cozy stalls of a winterized stable). The army still adheres to the principle of first the horses, then the motor vehicles, then the men, and finally the officers.

…After the foregoing build up I think you will be relieved to know that I am sleeping in a mess hall with the following officers: Lt. Ojala, an American Finn who has skied all his life, and is one of the skiing instructors without portfolio. Mr. Lindgren, formerly a Lieutenant in the Finnish army during their war with Russia in 1919-20. He is a native-born Swede, and later was an instructor for the Swedish Army in Skiing. He and Ojala use 9 ft, hickory skis without metal edges, and a very simple binding….

No doubt by this time you will realize that this battalion is like nothing seen in the army since the spring thaw at Valley Forge. The morale is generally good. Out of 1500 men less than 25 have gone over the hill, and that was because the pay was held up and the[y] were born in Mississippi and points south. For the most part they have had about 3 months service. The old timers have been drained out for cadres. The boys love the skiing. Lots of them are Scandinavian. There is one Finn that fought in Finland last winter…

We have numerous motor driven vehicles that look like hallucinations of the wizard of Oz. One of them played General Cummings' chief of staff a very dirty trick. The General had just ridden it successfully, and then he is reported to have

said, “Matthews you try it.” Col. Matthews got aboard and started off. They have a test course with some nasty bumps on it. Capt. Landaw said he was feeling his oats a little and let it out a little faster than usual. Some place in the midst of the worst bumps a steering knuckle broke, and the vehicle tossed the Captain, the Colonel, and itself into the air, and all three landed in a snow drift. Spectators say General Cummings thought it was a swell joke.

The organization of this business is divided into three parts. Battalion undergoing a certain type of training on skis and snow shoes. The Ski Patrol undergoing advanced training. The Patrol is the pampered baby. They can have anything they want, and their procurement officer just goes out and buys it. They have a special supply room for this equipment. The third organization in this is The Winter Warfare Training Board. It has a President just like the Infantry Board, Artillery Board, etc. There are nine officers on duty with the board, all with specific duties. I share all ski clothing and equipment with another officer. We are responsible under supervision of Col. Ready, the member of the Infantry Board sent up from Ft Benning, for test, and eventual specifications of this equipment….”
Captain Albert H. Jackman, Winter Warfare Training Board, Camp McCoy, Wis., circular letter to ten fellow reserve officers, New England Ski Museum, 2022.069.001.

March 1941: “In March 1941, Walter Wood phoned me to say that he had had an urgent request from Brigadier General Twaddle to come to Norfolk, Virginia, to discuss important mountaineering matters. I was asked to come with him.

At army headquarters at Old Point Comfort, we met General Twaddle, Colonel Walker and Lieutenant Colonel Hurdis. They knew of our planned summer expedition to the Saint Elias Range…

The discussion turned to our expedition, where we were going, and what we were planning to do. Before we departed we were offered and accepted the services of two B-18 bombers to carry out experiments during our expedition. We suggested that there could be problems with dropped loads being covered by snow before being found or loads being dragged into crevasses by wind. We were asked to work on these problems….

Soon after our return from General Twaddle’s headquarters, Captain Jackman, who was to be the army observer on our expedition, wrote to us and I arranged to take him climbing in the White Mountains. I liked him at once, found he had done some backpacking, and hustled him off to Ad Carter’s house in Jefferson, New Hampshire. The weather was not good, but after we managed to do a little rock climbing, both Ad and I concluded he would be a useful member of the expedition.

Jackman, who was involved in operations and training, found the Quartermaster General’s Office especially interested in the expedition, although it was in no way involved in the test we were making for General Twaddle. When Jackman arrived in the Yukon, he had both army and navy survival rations, which I had agreed to test with him.”
Robert H. Bates, *The Love of Mountains Is Best.* (Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Peter Randall, 1994), 167-170.

Spring of 1941 to February 1942: “G-3 (Operations and Training) Division of the General Staff of the War Department readily accepted the offer of the AAC to start me doing intelligence work on mountain warfare. Until February 1942 I spent full time finding and translating articles and books from German, French, Swiss and Italian sources, interviewing former mountain troopers who were living in the U.S., such as Hannes Schneider and Michl Feuersinger, who gave valuable first-hand information, and making digests of some of the most important lessons.”
H. Adams Carter, "Mountain Intelligence", *American Alpine Journal* Special War Number, 6, no. 2, 1946., 245.

April 1941 “Captain Lafferty, of the 15th Infantry, and member of the 3d Division Ski Patrol at Ft. Lewis, had been detailed to accompany Bestor Robinson and a party of ski experts on a ski touring expedition in the high Sierra of California for the purpose of testing equipment. Zero weather, blizzards, and gales met with by the group of twenty men, provided excellent conditions for testing the various items, and the results of these findings were incorporated into the recommendations sent to the Army during the summer.”
Major John C. Jay, *The Mountain Training Center*, Study No. 24, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1948, 8. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA955065, accessed 9-1-2022.

April 1941: “The Army inched one step closer to the creation of a mountain division. Colonels Hurdis and

Walker, along with Robert S. Monahan of the U.S. Forest Service, were ordered to study high-altitude sites in the west suitable for a one-division camp housing 15,000 men, where year-round training in winter and mountain maneuvers would be available.

The best choice seemed to be West Yellowstone, Montana, on the edge of Yellowstone National Park. It fulfilled all the requirements—access over a good railroad line, plenty of flat ground for barracks and artillery practice, and a pleasant community close at hand. But this ideal selection was frustrated by a rare fowl, the nearly extinct trumpeter swan. Trumpeters nested with the park; artillery and so many humans tramping about would disturb them. Frederic Delana, uncle of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a power in the Wildlife Conservation Committee, led the fight against the Army, and West Yellowstone was given up as a possible site. Whether the President himself indicated any concern about the trumpeter swan, or whether the consanguinity of Frederic Delano was responsible, nobody knows.

Colorado appeared to be the next best choice…The requirements were revised to call for an area sufficient to house 20,000 me, accessible by railroad and highway, with adequate fuel supplies nearby and water on the spot, containing sufficient area for maneuvers and artillery ranges. The choice narrowed down to three sites—Aspen, on a rather decrepit branch railroad line; Wheeler, eighteen miles from the nearest railroad at Leadville; and Pando, a whistle stop just north of Tennessee Pass, at 9,200 feet elevation on the main line of the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad and on a main highway, U.S. 24. Aspen, fortunately for its future, was ruled out because of insufficient space; Wheeler because of remoteness."
Hal Burton, *The Ski Troops*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), 89-90.

April 1941: "So, by the end of April 1941, the United States Army had ample data on various experimental ski patrols from which to conduct future operations. Not all the information was favorable—much of it pointed up lessons for later work—but all in all, the path toward activation of official mountain units in the United States Army, however rough, appeared possible."
Major John C. Jay, *The Mountain Training Center*, Study No. 24, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1948, 5-6. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA955065, accessed 9-1-2022.

July 2-4 1941: "Walter and Foresta Wood and Albert Jackman met me at the station [Whitehorse YT]. A couple of hours later we were eating moose steak for dinner when the roar of two big planes overhead told us that out two B-18 bombers had arrived. Minutes later the town seemed to have been invaded by the American air force. There were four pilots, three sergeants, an executive officer, and a special parachute officer, sent from Fort Benning, Georgia, to help us. The flight commander, Earl Jacobson, we soon discovered to be witty and well organized….

Two days later, on the Fourth of July, we had out first airdrop, throwing out several parachute loads and bulk food in multiple sacks without parachutes. From the air, we could tell that the chutes landed well near base camp, but a long streak of flour across the tundra showed where at least one free-fall had come to grief."
Robert H. Bates, *The Love of Mountains Is Best.* (Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Peter Randall, 1994), 170.

July 1941: "In our spare time Jackman and I had been testing various items for the army, including Bestor Robinson's tent, which, as directed, we pitched as a one-man, two-man, three-man, and four-man tent. We did not like any of them, especially if needed in areas of high wind and snow."
Robert H. Bates, *The Love of Mountains Is Best.* (Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Peter Randall, 1994),174.

July 1941: "During the expedition, two and one-half tons had been dropped with less than a six percent loss. We had also proved that fast travel in unknown mountain areas could be accomplished by experienced climbers using air supply. The expedition [the Wood Yukon Expedition] had accomplished all its objectives."
Robert H. Bates, *The Love of Mountains Is Best.* (Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Peter Randall, 1994), 181.

July 15, 1941: "On 15 July 1941 General Twaddle tried once more. He submitted a memorandum to the Chief of Staff on the need for organization of the mountain division, pointing out that we already had in existence triangular, secured, motorized cavalry, and armored divisions. "G-3 believes that there is a definite need that our Table of Organization also include a mountain division. This is a distinct type that cannot be readily improvised by attachment but must be specially organized and trained." Emphasis was to be on pack animal transport for combat elements. A Table of

Organization for a mountain division accompanied the memorandum. And, he added, "a mountain division also can be readily adapted to air transport that can other types."

Lt. Col. John M. Lentz backed him up a few days later in a memorandum: "All concerned agree in need for organization of the Mountain Division." He added that autogyros should be included organically for reconnaissance—one squadron for infantry and artillery use, in addition to the Division Reconnaissance Troop."
Major John C. Jay, *The Mountain Training Center*, Study No. 24, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1948, 10-11. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA955065, accessed 9-1-2022.

July 25, 1941: "With this support, Lt. Col. Mark W. Clark, G-3, submitted a memorandum for General McNair on 25 July 1941. "Recommend we concur; at least we may get one more division; its proposed equipment, including particularly artillery, is such that it could readily be moved by air." Dole and General Twaddle held their breath; it looked as if the Mountain Division was at last to become a reality."
Major John C. Jay, *The Mountain Training Center*, Study No. 24, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1948, 11. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA955065, accessed 9-1-2022.

August 5, 1941: "On 5 August General McNair sent back Colonel Clark's memorandum "without concurrence." He went on to state that while mountain division existed abroad, the need of any in our service was questionable. Moreover, the proposed organization was "inefficient so far as transportation is concerned, in that it has 7,983 animals, presumably mostly pack animals, and only 369 motor vehicles. Each howitzer of the division artillery involves 68 artillerymen and 68 animals. The pack animal is deplorably inefficient." General McNair went on to say that "rather than organize a special division, it is believed an effort should be made to adapt an infantry division, or the necessary components of it, to operations in difficult terrain…It is recommended that efforts for the present be directed toward the development of an infantry battalion and an artillery battalion, capable of operating effectively in mountainous terrain and containing a minimum of pack transportation and a maximum of motor transportation."
Major John C. Jay, *The Mountain Training Center*, Study No. 24, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1948, 11. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA955065, accessed 9-1-2022.

August 5, 1941: "On the same day as General McNair's memorandum, 5 August, Lt. Col. L. S. Gerow of the General Staff Corps stated in a memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, that decision on the small test force had been withheld pending result of cost estimates. He then went on to quote extracts from a recent report submitted by our military attaché to Italy, to the effect that the Italian army was defeated in the Balkan campaign by lack of well equipped mountain troops. After the Greek counteroffensive had driven the Italians back across the mountains of Albania in the dead of winter, "the Italian high command could only throw piecemeal into the operations infantry divisions of the line as fast as they could be gotten to Albania. These divisions were not organized, clothed, equipped, conditioned or trained for either winter or mountain fighting. The result was disaster. Twenty-five thousand were killed; ten thousand were frozen; large numbers made prisoners; loss in morale and prestige were irreparable." The extract concluded that "one of the most important lessons learned from this is that an army which may to fight anywhere in the world must have an important part of its major units especially organized, trained and equipped for fighting in the mountains and in winter… Such units cannot be improvised hurriedly from line divisions. They require long periods of hardening and experience, for which there is no substitute for time." As Colonel Gerow pointed out, this was a powerful argument for specialized training, and he suggested that the plan for a test force in the mountains again be taken up with a view to reconsideration.

Thus it became apparent that despite the efforts of the National Ski Patrol, it was the lessons learned from European armies that at last persuaded the War Department to take action for the development of mountain troops."
Major John C. Jay, *The Mountain Training Center*, Study No. 24, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1948, 11-12. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA955065, accessed 9-1-2022.

August 1941: While they were furthering plans for mountain training, Lt. General Lesley McNair, then Commander of Army Ground Forces, was simultaneously rejecting Twaddle's idea. It was after this major setback that more members of the AAC's National Defence [sic] Committee were brought into the lobbying loop and asked for help directly from Stimson. Thirty years later, Henry Hall and John Case, by then a retired executive of Standard Oil of New York, walked me twice around the lake at the Mohonk Mountain House while they described their lobbying visits to the

War Department, culminating in the final and decisive meeting with Stimson. The club's greatest asset in making the sale was its then president, James Grafton Rogers, who had been Undersecretary of State when Stimson was Secretary of State for Herbert Hoover."
William Lowell Putnam, *Green Cognac: The Education of a Mountain Fighter*. (New York: The AAC Press, 1991) 27-28.

Late summer 1941 (est.): "I was hardly back in my old dormitory when I received a letter from Lt. Col. L.O. Grice of the Office of Quartermaster General (OQMG) in Washington asking if I could meet him in Boston a few days later to discuss problems of mountain and winter warfare. I met him at the Essex Hotel near South Station. Grice was a square-built, balding, tough-looking man with a no-nonsense approach. Arriving when I did was a large, slightly lumbering, genial man of about my age, who introduced himself as Paul Siple. I knew that name at once. He was the Boy Scout who had gone to the Antarctic with the Byrd expeditions and been highly praised for his work there.

Grice asked us questions about our experience in cold-weather areas and the clothing and equipment we used. He was frank in his statements that the army needed help in getting better equipment. Alaska was already a concern of his, for reports had come in requesting better clothing. Grice also referred to the European war and the need for preparations if the U.S. became involved."
Robert H. Bates, *The Love of Mountains Is Best.* (Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Peter Randall, 1994), 183.

Early October 1941: "A few days later a letter from the quartermaster general of the army to Principal Lewis Perry of the academy arrived requesting that I be granted a leave of absence to come to the War Department as a civilian to work on mountain and winter warfare problems and equipment…. On reporting to the standardization branch, supply division, of the OQMG in the Railroad Retirement Building the next day, I entered a world very new to me. Gruff Colonel Grice was almost affable. …Apparently I was the first specialist on winter or mountain items to arrive, but Paul Siple and Bestor Robinson, whose tent I had tested in the Yukon, were supposed to arrive soon. Meanwhile, I read reports and learned how new items are officially adopted for army use."
Robert H. Bates, *The Love of Mountains Is Best.* (Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Peter Randall, 1994), 184.

October 22, 1941: "On 22 October, 1941, Dole received letters from Secretary of War Stimson and from General Marshall, stating that on 15 November, 1941, the 1st Battalion (Reinforced) 87th Mountain Infantry would be activated at Fort Lewis, Wash."
Major John C. Jay, *The Mountain Training Center*, Study No. 24, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1948, 12. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA955065, accessed 9-1-2022.

November 15, 1941: "The choice of Ft. Lewis as the site of the first official Mountain Troops in the United States Army was probably due to several contributing factors. It was the only Army post then in existence with the exception of Ft. Ethan Allen, Vt., which was located near the mountains. The unreliable snow conditions on Mt. Mansfield, closest to the latter camp, probably ruled out selection of that post. Two experimental ski patrols from the 3rd and 41st Divisions had already been in successful operation from Ft. Lewis during the winter o f 1940-41, and a great deal of preliminary ground work on equipment, training, and selection of personnel had been carried out by two officers of the 15th Infantry then stationed at that post. All in all it seemed a logical choice.

Because of the highly specialized nature of the training, it was essential that the proper personnel be picked to form cadres for the new outfit. With the exception of four Regular Army officers, all of whom had experience in winter climates or with pack animals, the initial cadre was organized from a canvass of men from the 3rd Division, the California National Guard, the 41st Division, and from volunteers who had had previous skiing experience in Yosemite and similar ski areas along the West Coast. This group, commanded by Lt. Col. Onslow S. Rolfe, himself a crack horseman, was soon augmented by a steady flow of volunteers and transfers from all parts of the country, but mainly from the New England area. The Mountain Troops soon lost their purely Western makeup and began to assume a definite Yankee character as more reinforcements continued to pour in from the East.

At this point G-1 enlisted the aid of the National Ski Patrol System in procuring and weeding out candidates for service in the Mountain Troops. All red tape was cut and The Adjutant General's Office authorized the NSPS to recruit properly qualified men. It was necessary for every inductee to fill out a questionnaire for approval by the NSPS before the Army

would accept him for service with the Mountain Troops. By February 1944, the NSPS had placed over eight thousand qualified men in this highly specialized branch of the service."
Major John C. Jay, *The Mountain Training Center*, Study No. 24, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1948, 12. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA955065, accessed 9-1-2022.

November 15, 1941: "With the establishment of the 1st Battalion, 87th Mountain Infantry, at Ft. Lewis on 15 November 1941, came a directive from Washington activating a Mountain and Winter Warfare Board, who purpose was to "test and develop mountain and winter equipment, formulate, develop and recommend changes in mountain and winter warfare doctrines," and write a manual on mountain equipment and tactics in general.

The President of the Board was Colonel Rolfe, who was also Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, 87th Mountain Infantry. Major Tillotson was a supervising office in charge of Quartermaster Material; Captain Jackman was Test Officer; Lieutenant Jay was Photographer and Meteorologist; and Private McKee was Clerk and Recorder.

The Board as set up was too small to operate efficiently. Colonel Rolfe was far too busy with his command duties to do much more than glance over the reports prepared for his signature by Captain Jackman. Lieutenant Jay was occupied with taking pictures of the experiments as well as making weather observations three times daily. Major Tillotson spent a great deal of time shuttling about the country obtaining supplies. The result was that Captain Jackman and Private McKee were working up to eighteen hours a day, seven days a week, trying to get their tests done and reports written on time."
Major John C. Jay, *The Mountain Training Center*, Study No. 24, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1948, 96-97. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA955065, accessed 9-1-2022.

December 7, 1941: "Jackman and I left Washington early on December 7, 1941, to spend a day rock climbing at Bull Run, Virginia. We did a number of short climbs, had good views of the battlefields, and with no idea of what had been happening elsewhere that day began to drive back to Washington. Traffic soon became extraordinarily heavy for no reason we could imagine. We finally got back to the city and passed a large crowd surrounding the Japanese embassy on Massachusetts Avenue.

We turned into Jack's driveway and opened his front door. There was a hail from his wife, who was upstairs, welcoming us. "You've got to put your uniform on now, Jack," she called.

Jack looked disgusted. Army officers in Washington had not been wearing uniforms, probably in order to conceal how their number had grown.

"Doggone it," he said, "now why did they have to do that?"

She came to the head of the stairs. "Haven't you heard? The Japanese have bombed Pearl Harbor." It was the first we knew of it."
Robert H. Bates, *The Love of Mountains Is Best.* (Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Peter Randall, 1994), 188.